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II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This piece of work addresses the Miller case, a case that was decided in the 
Supreme Court in appeal from the High Court. In light of the factum given, the case is 
also analysed in relation to Brexit from the perspective of the United Kingdom, and 
revolving around the matters the case involved. 
 The case deals with constitutional matters such as conventions and constitutional 
principles, as well as issues coming from the devolved administrations, whom try to be 
heard in the case through the references to the Court. The importance of this case is really 
broad affecting a variety of issues and making it necessary to take into account some 
ancillary matters to get a full understanding of it.  
Moreover, as the Miller case is a direct consequence of Brexit and the referendum 
held in the United Kingdom in 2016, some thought is given to those phenomena and its 
characteristics. Besides, the European Union law is also relevant to the case, as it was a 
decision on the way the United Kingdom had to give notification as to the withdrawal 





 The referencing system used along this paper is the Oxford Standard for Citation 
of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA), as it is the most common referencing system for legal 






The 2007 Governance of Britain Green Paper said, “[a] distinguishing feature of 
the British constitution is the extent to which the government continues to exercise a 
number of powers which were not granted to it by a written constitution, nor by 
Parliament, but are rather ancient prerogatives of the Crown. These powers derive from 
arrangements which preceded the 1689 Declaration of Rights and have been accumulated 
by the government without Parliament or the people having a say.” 
 







IV. BACKGROUND TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE 
MILLER CASE 
First of all, a brief historic insight to British Constitutional Law is required in order 
to get a clear understanding of its functioning and where certain elements as the 
prerogative powers come from.  
Unlike most countries, the United Kingdom does not have a constitution. At least 
not in the sense of a single coherent code of fundamental law which prevails over all other 
sources of the law. The fact that William I attained kingship by conquest meant that he 
held every power or authority. To help himself rule, he surrounded himself with a Council 
composed by great nobles and officers in attendance of the King.  
It was in 1295 when Edward II formed the initial Parliament as he needed more 
than a small Council to rule. The Parliament was constituted through the invitation by the 
King of “the barons, the clergy, and the commons, represented by two knights elected by 
each county, two citizens for each city, and two burgesses for each borough.”1 In spite of 
that, the Council remained in control of the executive powers, and therefore, the King. 
The prerogative powers of the Crown which will be analysed later on the paper, are what 
is left from those original powers of the Crown, that have not been substituted or regulated 
by statute. 
Although there was a certain distribution of powers within the different 
institutions, there was not a real division of powers, as the power of the King, the 
Parliament and the Courts were never clearly stablished, and they varied with the power 
of the King. With the Tudors for example, under the rule of Willian VIII, the power of 
the King became so strong that he even got an enactment from Parliament to give his 
proclamations the force of the law.  
Even nowadays, the functions of each of the powers of the State is not confined 
or limited to the powers they come exercising. In fact, there is some criticism towards 
how the executive has been encroaching the spheres of the legislative and the judiciary.2 
Given such history, it is no surprise that the Constitution of the United Kingdom 
is not a coded body of legislation, but a series of principles spread through the case law 
with its roots on the Law of the Land, and subject to being continuously growing. 
Reflecting on its development and its contents, the United Kingdom’s constitution was 
described by the constitutional scholar, Professor AV Dicey, as “the most flexible polity 
in existence”.3 
In the Miller case, the United Kingdom Supreme Court ruled that the United 
Kingdom Government may not initiate withdrawal from de European Union by formal 
notification to the Council of the European Union –as prescribed by Article 50 of the 
Treaty on the European Union– without an Act of Parliament allowing it. 
The Court ruled against the government and, two days later they brought to 
Parliament the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017. In the Miller 
                                                          
1 AB Keith, Introduction to British Constitutional Law (Clarendon Press 1931), 3. 
2 Ibid, 2. 
3 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, 1915), p 87. 
7 
 
case, there was also debated whether the three regions that compose the UK had to agree 
to such withdrawal.  
Since the referendum of the 23rd of June 2016, Brexit has been the major political 
topic in the United Kingdom and Europe. With the triumph of the exit over the remain in 
the European Union (51.9% and 48.1% respectively),4 there has been a lot of concern 
with the implications of the result –due to the disparity of the vote and the small voting 
difference between both choices. 
Such disparity was made evident in the distribution of the votes. Out of the four 
countries that form the United Kingdom, in two of them (Scotland and Northern Ireland) 
the majority voted for remain. In that scenario, the Devolved Administrations of the 
countries wanted to have a say in the decision, rather than completely leave it to the 
Central Government. 
The result of the referendum, carried out by the government lead by former Prime 
Minister David Cameron, gave place to a sharp polarization of the public; divided in those 
in favour or against of the remain in the European Union. The division of the vote was 
strong between different generations, social classes, levels of education and between big 
cities and rural areas. 
This way, the youngest tended to vote for remain –up to 73% of under 24– while 
the older the voter, the more probability it would vote for leave –up to 64% of +65 years 
old.5 
After the referendum was celebrated and the majority voted to leave, the 
Government started to take the required steps to abandon the European Union; starting 
by executing the Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union,6 which contemplates this 
process.  
In a situation like the aforementioned, with various political promises that had 
been used in the campaign for and against Brexit and which were recognised to be 
unworkable; many critics and opposition arose against the Brexit referendum and exposed 
their doubts about the process.  
This paper will mainly address the legal implications of Brexit, especially in light 
of the Miller case;7 which revolves around the issue of who had the power to trigger 
Article 50 in order to withdraw from the European Union: the Government, the 
Parliament or, even, if the devolved legislatures had a say in it.  
The Miller case draw, because of its relation with Brexit, a lot of attention from 
the media and the public in general. Being a really controversial judgement, even 
                                                          
4 The Electoral Commission, ‘EU Referendum Results’ <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-
information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-
referendum/electorate-and-count-information> accessed 2nd March 2018. 
5 D Kingman, ‘Intergenerational Foundation’ (Generation Remain: Understanding the Millennial vote, 4th 
Oct 2017) <http://www.if.org.uk/research-posts/generations-remain-understanding-millennial-vote/> 
accessed 2nd March 2018. 
6 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, art 50. 
7 R. (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC5; 
[2017] 2 WLR 583. 
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academics held really different and strong opinions. Thus, the case is commented by 
everyone in the United Kingdom, contributing to an agitated atmosphere around it. 
Nevertheless, the significance of this case has little to do with the political 
implications of it, but with the issues of constitutional law involved. The sovereignty of 
Parliament and the constitutional place of the Government in international affairs were at 
the centre of the debate; and this is where the relevance of the case really is, and not in 




























V. MILLER CASE 
 
i. Introduction 
The central case is R. (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union.8 
This case was a judgment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in appeal 
from the High Court, on whether the government had a prerogative power to trigger 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, which contains the process to abandon it. 
As the government intended to do so, an action was brought to the High Court 
by Gina Miller and Deir Tozetti Dos Santos that questioned the entitlement of the 
Government to trigger Article 50. The High Court was unanimous in the judgement that 
the Crown’s prerogative powers did not allow the Government to trigger Article 50, and 
that it was the exclusive right of the Parliament to do so.9 
The government, not agreeing with the decision of the High Court, appealed the 
decision to the Supreme Court in the same terms alleged to the first instance. To this 
appeal, references by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland10 and by the Court of 
Appeal (Northern Ireland)11 joined the case. The references are a procedure through 
which the administrations can raise questions to the Court. Apart from that, Wales and 
Scotland were represented by the Counsel General of Wales and the Lord Advocate, 
respectively. The mentioned references made allusion to the involvement of the 
devolved administrations in the decision of triggering Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
The Supreme Court in this appeal upheld the decision of the High Court in the 
previous judgement. Eight out of the eleven Justices supported the defendants initial 
claim and decided that an Act of Parliament was required in order to trigger Article 50. 
Apart from this, in respect to the references brought by the devolved administrations, the 
Supreme Court decided that their consent was not necessary in order to proceed with the 






                                                          
8 Miller (n 7). 
9 R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768. 
10 Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland - In the matter of an application by Agnew and 
others for Judicial Review [2017] UKSC 5. 
11 Reference by the Court of Appeal (Northern Ireland) – In the matter of an application by Raymond 
McCord for Judicial Review [2017] UKSC 5 
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ii. Case Law and Prerogative Powers of the Crown 
In the Miller case, one of the main issues that arose, was whether the government 
of the United Kingdom had the capability to trigger Article 50. Such capability would 
come, according to their arguments, from the prerogative powers of the Crown; these 
prerogative powers allow the government to carry out certain measures without going 
through Parliament. In the words of the justices: 
“The Secretary of State’s case is based on the existence of the well-established 
prerogative powers of the Crown to enter into and to withdraw from treaties. He contends 
that ministers are entitled to exercise this power in relation to the European Union 
Treaties, and therefore to give Notice without the need for any prior legislation.”12 
The prerogative powers, as explained before, are what remains of the powers with 
which monarchs used to govern the country. Nowadays, such powers are exercised by the 
executive, i.e. the Government, in order to perform some of its activity. The prerogative 
powers include some such as the declaration of war, the disposition of the armed forces, 
the signing of international treaties and the conduct of international relations; 
nevertheless, they are so imprecise that it is impossible to include them in a list.13 
Whenever the Parliament legislates through statute any of the matters that can be 
carried out by prerogative powers, it ceases to be a prerogative power, and becomes a 
statutory power, and therefore, controlled by the Parliament.14 The existence of this 
unregulated powers may seem anachronic in a liberal democracy at the present time, 
having in mind that these have not been debated in or restrained by Parliament. 
Furthermore, the lack of transparency is another characteristic that may seem odd in the 
XXI century; the fact that there is not a way to compose a list of such powers, and the 
difficulty to make Ministers accountable for the exercise of the prerogative powers, 
contribute to the growing criticism to this instrument. 
Despite that criticism, the Parliament could indeed regulate the prerogative 
powers and substitute them for more limited and detailed statutory powers, but it has not 
done so; thus, it must be assumed that the Parliament does not find these powers as a 
challenge to its sovereignty. There have been, nevertheless, some attempts to change this 
situation, and the idea that at least there should be a list of such powers is increasing its 
presence within the Parliament.15 
In 2007, the Government agreed that the prerogative powers should be –to some 
extent– regulated through statute, and that the control of the Parliament over them should 
be greater.16 As consequence, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 was 
enacted, regulating the organization of the Civil Service and the power to make 
international treaties. 
                                                          
12 Miller (n 7), para [34]. 
13 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Pt 2. 
14 M Elliot and R Thomas, ‘Public Law’ (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2014), 144. 
15 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, ‘Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening 
Ministerial Accountability to Parliament’ (HC 422 2003-04). 
16 Ministry of Justice, ‘The Governance of Britain’ (Cm 7170 2007), 15-17. 
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In the Miller case, the Crown’s prerogative powers were subject to judicial review, 
as the claimants argued that that was not the appropriate process in order to withdraw 
from the European Union. The main argument of the claimants against the use of the 
prerogative powers was as the Court put it that  
“The applicants’ case in that connection is that when Notice is given, the United 
Kingdom will have embarked on an irreversible course that will lead to much of EU law 
ceasing to have effect in the United Kingdom, whether or not Parliament repeals the 1972 
Act. As Lord Pannick QC put it for Mrs Miller, when ministers give Notice they will be 
“pulling … the trigger which causes the bullet to be fired, with the consequence that the 
bullet will hit the target and the Treaties will cease to apply”. In particular, he said, some 
of the legal rights which the applicants enjoy under European Union law will come to an 
end. This, he submitted, means that the giving of Notice would pre-empt the decision of 
Parliament on the Great Repeal Bill. It would be tantamount to altering the law by 
ministerial action, or executive decision, without prior legislation, and that would not be 
in accordance with our law.”17 
Such argument was based in that, although the prerogative powers do allow the 
government to conduct international relations without the assistance of Parliament; in this 
case, that would result in the citizens of the United Kingdom losing all their rights 
protected under European Union law.  
Moreover, the European Union law is enforceable in the United Kingdom due to 
the European Communities Act 1972 as it says in its section 2(1) that “[a]ll such rights, 
powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or 
under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for 
by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment 
to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available 
in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 
“enforceable European Union right” and similar expressions shall be read as referring to 
one to which this subsection applies.” Therefore, the exercise of the prerogative powers 
would contravene the constitutional principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, inasmuch as 
the executive would be legislating instead of Parliament by triggering Article 50 –because 
that would leave ineffective the Communities Act. 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom is among the 
most stablished and respected principles, being one of the principles that basically 
configurated all the history of the United Kingdom since the creation of its Parliament; 
being one of the earliest countries where the people had a certain control over the 
monarchs. 
What the Secretary of State –representing the government in the case– answered 
to this argument was that unless the Parliament had enacted a statute, expressly limiting 
the prerogative powers of the Crown as to this matter (which it had not done); there was 
no basis to sustain that the prerogative should not be used in the context of exiting the 
European Union. In this first argument the Secretary of State resorts to the preeminent 
                                                          
17 Miller (n 7), [36]. 
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position of the literacy in the Anglo-Welsh law, which is considered more reliable and 
enjoy a better consideration in Courts than principles, which are more uncertain.  
 Also, he argued that the Parliament would have to play his part after the 
notification, by the negative ratifying procedure with the withdrawal treaty; i.e. once 
notified the withdrawal, the Parliament should ratify –or not– the leaving treaty and its 
conditions. Thus, with that necessary decision in the ratification by Parliament, the 
Government thinks that the involvement of the Parliament would be enough; as it would 
have the final decision on the ratifying of the agreement. 
Nevertheless, the intention of the claim by the applicants is not on the intervention 
of Parliament in the process, but the inadequacy of the prerogative powers to give notice 
to the European Union, which they think should be made by Parliament. Even if it has to 
ratify it afterwards, is in who holds the power to trigger Article 50 where the claim is. 
As to the European Communities Act 1972, the Secretary of State says that as the 
Parliament did not expressly mention that the withdrawal of the treaty should be made 
through an act of Parliament; that suggests that it was the intention of the Parliament that 
it should be done through the prerogative. The assumption the Secretary of State makes 
here is an interpretation of the facts that should be done by the Court and that therefore 
holds not real weigh as an argument beyond making the Justices consider such uncertain 
interpretation. 
Moreover, the Secretary of State recognises that although the 2015 Referendum 
Act does not expressly allow the government to give notice, the fact that it is silent on 
that matter means, again, that the Parliament supported the persistence of the prerogative 
powers to give notice.  
“Although the 2015 Referendum Act does not itself confer statutory power on the 
Secretary of State to give notice under Article 50(2), the implication from the fact that the 
2015 Referendum Act is silent on the issue whether legislation is required before notice 
could be given under that Article supported the contention that Parliament accepted the 
continued existence of the prerogative powers of the Crown to give such notice: it 
certainly contains no restriction on such prerogative power as may still exist.”18 
It is not irrelevant that the Secretary of State uses as argument the inexistence of 
an express wording in the law saying that the prerogative powers may be used, but at the 
same time he argues that the principles that the High Court considered applicable are 
uncertain because they are not exactly developed or written in the law. It is relevant 
because that argument can easily be applied to his own arguments as they are mere 
suppositions, and therefore, even more uncertain. 
In fact, the judges of the High Court stated in relation to the Communities Act, 
that the argument of the Secretary of State goes too far in its interpretation that the non-
express exclusion of the prerogative powers means that indeed they can be used in this 
matter.19 
                                                          
18 Miller (n 9), [76]. 
19 Ibid, [81]. 
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The judgement was based in two main reasons: 
1. The principle that the Crown cannot use its prerogative powers to alter 
domestic law and, 
2. The Crown’s prerogative power operates only in the international plane. 
 
1. The High Court said in its judgement that the first principle had a strong 
constitutional tradition evolved to this days from the attempts to constrain the prerogative 
powers of the Crown. Therefore, it would be hard to believe that actually by the enactment 
of the European Communities Act 1972, the Parliament intended to leave the door open 
for the prerogative powers to act. 
This first constitutional principle was summarised in The Zamora case, in which 
Lord Parker said, “No one would contend that the prerogative involves any power to 
prescribe or alter the law administered in Courts of Common Law or Equity”.20 Also, in 
The Case of Proclamations, Sir Edward Coke said that “the King by his proclamation or 
other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law or the customs of 
the realm” and “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows 
him”.2122 
2. As the court states, this is a principle quite interrelated with the previous one 
and it derives from the conception that the Crown can act through prerogative powers on 
the international plane because it has no effect in domestic law.23 The idea is, in short, 
that the prerogative powers cannot have any impact into the domestic law whenever they 
act. The judges refer to the case of R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p Lord 
Rees-Mogg,24 in which the decision of the judges was that the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht could not happen without the approval of Parliament, since this treaty would 
have a great impact in the national law. 
In the mentioned case, in order to sign a Treaty that affected national law, as the 
Treaty of Maastricht did, it was necessary the approval of Parliament; then, it is indeed 
easily deducted by analogy that the same should happen the other way around, i.e. if the 
withdrawal of a Treaty will affect the national law, the Parliament should approve such 
withdrawal. 
Another element of the judgement, which has been quite criticised, was the 
interpretation of the European Communities Act 1972 as a ‘constitutional’ statute.25 The 
interpretation that the Court does of this Act is as it had a superior qualification than other 
statutes, making it more protected in a certain way, or at least, it seems to be treated not 
just as a normal act derived from an international treaty; but conferring it a special value. 
 
                                                          
20 The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77. 
21 The Case of Proclamations (1610) 12 Co Rep 74. 
22 Miller (n 9), [27-33]. 
23 Ibid, [89]. 
24 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex p Lord Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552. 




In respect to that, as it had been said by Laws LJ in Thoburn v Sunderland City 
Council,26 where he described the Communities Act as a constitutional statute, the Court 
also said that it “[has] such importance in our legal system that it is not subject to the 
usual wide principle of implied repeal by subsequent legislation. Its importance is such 
that that it could only be repealed or amended by express language in a subsequent statute 
or by necessary implication from the provisions of such statute”,27 stating hence, its 
different qualification compared with other statutes. 
In the same line, to support this idea of a constitutional statute with a different 
qualification, the Court mentions that Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord 
Mance JSC in R. (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State of Transport28 
describe the Communities Act 1972 as one of a number of constitutional instruments. 
These principles supported the idea of the judges that, as triggering Article 50, 
would result in the loss and ineffectiveness of quite a lot of European rights for United 
Kingdom citizens −that had been transposed into domestic law, or that are in fact directly 
applicable– then triggering that Article through the prerogative powers, would mean that 
the prerogative have indeed altered the domestic law, and therefore, it goes against those 
constitutional principles. 
As to this matter, the High Court stated that the constitutional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty prevents the Crown from having power to alter domestic law 
through prerogative power29 and therefore, the withdrawal from the European Union 
should be notified through an act of the Parliament. 
The judgement of the Supreme Court was in the same lines than that of the High 
Court. The Justices remarked the Case of Proclamations and The Zamora again as an 
important source of the limits of the prerogative; as well as, the Bill of Rights 1688 and 
the Claim of Rights 1689 (the latter for Scotland), which again exclude the possibility to 
change the law by any other than Parliament. 
The Court highlighted the dualist version theory by which domestic and 
international affairs happen in different spheres, and how this is the reason why the 
prerogatives are able to conduct international affairs. The dualist vision says that while 
the two spheres do not have effect in the other, the supremacy of the Parliamentary should 
be secure; nevertheless, in the Miller case that dualism is challenged.30 
In the judgement the Justices recurred to what Professor Campbell McLachlan 
said of the dualist theory, being it that “if treaties have no effect within domestic law, 
Parliament’s legislative supremacy within its own polity is secure. If the executive must 
always seek the sanction of Parliament in the event that a proposed action on the 
                                                          
26 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 (DC). 
27 Miller (n 9), [44]. 
28 R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State of Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 WLR 
324, [207]. 
29 Miller (n 9), [86-89]. 




international plane will require domestic implementation, parliamentary sovereignty is 
reinforced at the very point at which the legislative power is engaged.”31 
As to the European Communities Act 1972, the Supreme Court decided, after 
some major reasoning, that it is an “entirely new, independent and overriding source of 
domestic law”.32 In this view, such act is a source of domestic law as it was enacted by 
Parliament; and it is because of this that European law is applicable in the United 
Kingdom. This way, the European Communities Act 1972 would be a source of European 
law within the domestic law, given force by Parliament, and therefore, part of the 
domestic legislation. What this means is that the mentioned act is as the court says an 
independent source of domestic law,33 and therefore it cannot be repealed or amended via 
the prerogative powers, as it would get into the national sphere of law. 
What the Supreme Court decided –without getting too deep into it, since the 
judgement and arguments were similar– was to uphold the previous decision made by the 
High Court, sustaining the same ideas in which it was based, and adding some further 
justifications for the validity of the given arguments. 
The majority of the Justices held this view of the case, but there were three of 
them who dissented. The major reasons for dissenting were the willingness –in the 
majority’s view– to talk about constitutional principles to support their arguments without 
fully getting into the constitutional traits of them. The Justices often refer to concepts 
such as “constitutional statute”, which deserve an exhaustive explanation, without giving 
too much importance to the fact that they are naming it a constitutional matter.  
The Justice that held a more opposite view to that of the majority was Lord Reed. 
In his view, the Communities Act gives European Union law direct effect on national law, 
but within a framework stablished by Parliament in which Parliamentary sovereignty 
remains the fundamental principle.34 He also held that the wording of the section 2 of the 
Act “demonstrates that Parliament has recognised that rights given effect under the 1972 
Act may be added to, altered or revoked without the necessity of a further Act of 
Parliament.”35 However, it should be noted that the section 2 of the Act does not include 
–as Lord Reed says– the word “revoke” at all. 
The minority (through Lord Reed’s judgment) determined that the European 
Communities Act 1972 did not create any statutory rights, at least not as other statutes. 
On the contrary, it gave legal effect in the United Kingdom to European Union legislation 
for as long as the Country is a Member State. Such condition depended and still depends 
on the Crown’s prerogative powers and there was and still is nothing in the Communities 
Act to demonstrate that Parliament has taken away the Crown’s prerogative power to 
withdraw from Treaties. 
Nevertheless, the dissenting Justices could be regarded as too formal or technical, 
lacking a broader view of the issue and being too dependent of the exact wording of the 
                                                          
31 C McLachlan, ‘Foreign Relations Law’ (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2014), 156. 
32Miller (n 7), [80]. 
33 Miller (n 7), [61]. 
34 Ibid, [183]. 
35 Ibid, [186]. 
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relevant law to the case; ignoring these constitutional principles that should affect the 
perception of the case. 
The majority certainly address most of the arguments of the Secretary of State        
–which were quite weak, in some cases just appealing to the mere existence of the 
prerogative– in a really logical manner, and they easily discard them. Nevertheless, it is 
in the backing of their own arguments were the Justices start to employ this conceptual 
wording which makes the case somewhat feeble and not as convincing as a constitutional 
principle should be. 
As it has been shown, the result of the decision of the Supreme Court was similar 
to that of the High Court; nevertheless, it was also questioned about devolution issues by 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
 
iii. Devolution issues and Conventions 
To the initial appeal of the Government made by the Secretary of State, joined two 
references made by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland and the Court of Appeal 
of Northern Ireland.36 In addition to this, devolution issues brought by the Scottish and 
Welsh administrations were also raised before the Supreme Court.37 A reference is 
basically a question raised to the Supreme Court by certain institutions of the United 
Kingdom that can use such instrument.  
▪ The questions raised by Northern Ireland in the references, involve the possibility 
that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (or the Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish 
Agreement) may require primary legislation before the notice is given by the 
government under the prerogative powers. Moreover, if that was the case, if the 
Northern Ireland Assembly needs to consent to such legislation. 
 
▪ On the other hand, it is also questioned if under the Northern Ireland Act section 
75, it is necessary the consent of the Northern Ireland Office in order to give 
notice. Besides, a question on whether giving notice without the consent of the 
people of Northern Ireland would go against section 1 of that same Act. 
There was another question inquiring if there was any limitation to the use of the 
prerogative powers due to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 or the Belfast Agreement and 
the British-Irish Agreement. This question was superseded because it was already 
stablished by the Court that the use of the prerogative powers of the Crown was not the 
way to proceed to trigger Article 50.38 
The commonality of the issues brought by the devolved administrations made the 
Court give a broad answer for every of them in most of the issues (except for some of the 
questions in the references). 
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To the possibility that primary legislation may be needed due to the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, before making use of the prerogative powers; the Court refers to what 
it said previously about the need for primary legislation. Because domestic law will be 
changed by the exercise of Article 50 (also affecting the Northern Ireland Act), the 
prerogative powers are not adequate to give notice and it is necessary an act of Parliament 
–as the Justices already argued. 
As to the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly, it is necessary to refer to the 
Sewel Convention.39 The Sewel Convention is contained in the Memorandum of 
Association and Supplementary Agreements and says that normally the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom would not legislate on devolved matters, but with the consent of the 
devolved legislature.40 Nevertheless, in section 5(6) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998 and section 107(5) of the Government of Wales 
Act 2006, it is substantially said that despite it, the Parliament still has the power to make 
laws in the devolved legislatures. Therefore, the Parliament is allowed to legislate in spite 
of what the Sewel Convention says. 
This way section 5(6) of the Northern Ireland Act says that “[t]his section does 
not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Northern 
Ireland, but an Act of the Assembly may modify any provision made by or under an Act 
of Parliament in so far as it is part of the law of Northern Ireland.” Accordingly, the Acts 
of the other two devolved legislatures have a similar section. 
The reason why the legislation of the devolved administrations includes sections 
where basically it is said that the Parliament can ignore the Sewel Convention is because 
conventions, as will be analysed more deeply later in the paper, do not hold legal nature.  
Apart from this, the convention is described in the second paragraph of the 
Memorandum of Understanding as a source of political intention, but not as a legal 
source. Because of this political nature the Justices refused to give an answer, saying that 
they could not enforce a convention as it does not create legal obligations. 
The Court was in this decision quite conservative saying that they “can recognise 
the operation of a political convention in the context of deciding a legal question, but they 
cannot give legal rulings on its operation or scope”. 41 In contrast with every other matter 
that was decided in this case in which the judges resorted to constitutional principles and 
concepts derived from them, in a quite progressive and interpretative manner. 
In fact, it is reasonably argued the idea that the conventions do hold certain legal 
nature as they can be considered to have a constitutional status as part of the devolution 
agreements.42 Existing this debate and being it clearly more in line with the overall of the 
judgement given, it is unclear why the judges chose to understand it the other way around. 
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What can be understood by that is that, the inconsistency with the previous 
arguments of the judgement can be interpreted as the reluctance of the Court to decide on 
the matter. This probably because –in line with the argument of the Justices– the resulting 
decision of the Court could be quite unpopular, and they had no interest in dragging even 
more attention to the case, which was already quite unpopular.43 
The last two questions made by the references are based on sections 75 and 1 of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998; by the first one it is being asked if the Northern Ireland 
Office should consent to the notification of Article 50. The section 75 of the act44 contains 
certain obligations for public authorities exercising its functions in relation with Northern 
Ireland; but as the Court points out, it is not applicable to the Ministers of the Crown as 
they are not in the definition that section gives of “public authority”. Besides, as it had 
been decided that there was no prerogative power to give notice, the Northern Ireland 
Office does not have any part in it as it is a matter of the Parliament. 
As to the last question, section 1 of the act45 recognises the possibility for Northern 
Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland and, therefore, it does not really have 
any interest or consequence in this case. 
It is clear that the devolution issues in the Miller case played a minor role and that 
the Court was not willing to get into them in depth; that decision was probably right as 
the centre of the case was the notification of Article 50 by prerogative powers and not the 
issues arising from the devolved legislatures. The devolved legislation and the 
conventions, and its part in the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom, should be 
addressed in its own on a different judgement, because the legal consequences of that 
would be great but not related to this case. 
As we have seen in the case, the conventions do not have a legal nature, but a 
political one. In Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada,46 the Supreme 
Court of Canada shared the view that conventions are not laws but some of them may 
even be more important than laws. Although conventions are rules, they do not impose 
any legal obligations, and the Courts cannot enforce them; they should be regarded as a 
guidance for the government and politics.47 As Dicey said, another way conventions 
should be regarded is as a way to keep the constitution flexible, without affecting the legal 
framework of the rest of the law. 
As it is of interest on this case, the prerogative powers of the Crown are also developed 
by convention. The conventions put a limit on some of the powers of the Crown: 48 
a) The Monarch’s prerogative to appoint the Prime Minister must be exercised in 
favour of the person who commands a majority in the House of Commons.  
b) The prerogative to appoint other members of the government must be exercised 
on the advice of the Prime Minister.  
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c) The prerogative to grant or refuse the Royal Assent must be exercised in favour 
of all Bills approved by the Commons and the Lords.  
d) The prerogative to summon Parliament must be exercised annually.  
e) The prerogative to dissolve Parliament must be exercised on the advice of the 
Prime Minister.  
Conventions also rule aspects of the governing of the United Kingdom such as the 
practice of the Cabinet government, the work of Parliament or the relation between the 
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. 
Nevertheless, not every usual or ritualistic practices are recalled as conventions; in 
order to be recognised as a convention Sir Ivor Jennings proposed three tests that must be 
answered:49 
a) Are there sufficient precedents? 
b) Did those involved believe they were bound by a rule?  
c) Is there a good constitutional reason for the rule? 
There are quite a few similarities between law and convention. On one hand, they are 
regarded as rules and are affected by precedent in order to stablish its validity; on the 
other hand, both impose a degree of obligation and the violation of them bring 
consequences. 
Notwithstanding with the above, it is well stablished by the case law that 
conventions will not be applied by the Courts, and that where the law and a convention 
may apply, the Court will always apply the law. 50 
In Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke51 for example, the Privy Council rejected the 
argument that the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 should not be applied because it 
contravened the convention that stated that Parliament would not legislate for a dominion 
unless the dominion requested it to do so. 
Finally, conventions may be applied in Court if transposed into law (within an 
Statute) what would make them a legal rule, and not just a political one. There are three 
possible ways to do so.  
The first way is that the wording of the convention or its understanding could be 
directly transposed into an Statute; the second way would be that in which an Statute 
makes reference to the relevant terms of the general practice, changing its legal status to 
that of law; and the third way to make a convention legally binding is a variation of the 
second method where the name of the convention is expressly referred to as binding.52 
With all of the above, the decision of the Court on the Miller case is clearly 
sustained as the conventions would not be applicable by the Court; however, looking at 
the rest of the sentence and the importance the justices give to the ‘constitutional’ traits 
that the European Communities Act 1972 has, the justices could have gone a step further 
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and recognise the significance of conventions to the British constitutional law, and not 
just ignore them. 
 
VI. EFFECTS OF BREXIT AND THE MILLER CASE WITHIN PUBLIC LAW 
Now that the Miller case has been analysed, it is pertinent to approach Brexit and 
its implications with the case, as it configured the background in which the case evolved. 
Brexit exploded in 2016 with the referendum called by former Prime Minister 
David Cameron, who had promised it if he were to be re-elected as Prime Minister. Prior 
to that, the scenario in which the Brexit appeared was boosted by the Euro-zone crisis, 
immigration and the subordination to European Union law, among other things. Politics 
started to blame the European Union for the situation, and the lack of political resources 
they had to deal with the crisis. The relation of the United Kingdom with the European 
Union was difficult since the very beginning of it, and there had always been scepticism 
towards it.  
The situation being as mentioned above and the political and mediatic discourse 
–especially of the right-wing media– increasing its tone against the European Union, it 
was a matter of time for a political party to exploit the existing voting space that claiming 
independence from the European Union could be. The party that arose in that place was 
the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), this party based its campaign in the 
necessity to leave the European Union in order to regain the lost sovereignty of the 
domestic institutions, quotas on immigration and the high cost that the membership 
supposed. 
The anti-euro speech of this party increased the perception that the European 
Union was to blame for the economic and social situation of the country. As UKIP rose 
in the polls, the other formations tried to stop them by imitating this speech –adapting the 
speech to attract more voters– and almost every party was at that point being critical with 
the Union. 
This situation led to the aforementioned promise of David Cameron (Conservative 
Party), to hold a referendum on the matter if he won the national elections, which he did. 
Once he won, and the referendum was going to happen, the Government lowered their 
sceptical speech towards the rest of Europe –which may suggest that they were not really 
committed with that discourse– and started to promote the vote for remain in the European 
Union. 
The European Union had already faced these issues with United Kingdom since 
the Treaty on European Union was approved. After it, the United Kingdom enacted the 
European Union Act 2011, by which any treaty altering the Treaty on European Union or 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union53, would be ratified by referendum. 
Also, after his re-election, negotiations started aiming to re-establish the position of the 
United Kingdom inside the European Union but did not succeed. 
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After the Miller case, apart from what has been said before, some questions arise 
in relation with Brexit. 
The Miller case was in the public eye for quite a long time, with a lot of debate 
around it and not many less controversies. The media played a big role on this agitation 
around the case as the main newspapers of the country fiercely attacked anyone involved 
in the case, from the judges to the claimants.54 Miller case forced the Government to go 
through Parliament, and many people questioned the legitimacy of the decision of the 
Justices and even how they are elected for such position; questioning the independence 
of the judiciary.  
The Justices tried to make clear from the very beginning of the case that this was 
not a political matter, but a constitutional one, and that the Court would not under any 
circumstance impede the United Kingdom from leaving the European Union; the issue to 
the Court was just how it should be done. 
Despite this, it is true that the case result gave place to a series of political 
consequences as the people in favour of remaining in the European Union, saw the 
judgement as a sign that the withdrawal from the Union should not happen, and started to 
claim so to the political parties. Nevertheless, this was not what the Court intended and 
that is why they made such a remark in the case not being about politics. 
 
i. Devolved administrations 
An important question that arises from the case is how the Government will 
manage the tensions with the devolved administrations as a result from the Government 
deciding by them; ignoring the conventions stablished between them and their statutes. It 
is unclear if the competences that the European Union had, will be centralised or devolved 
to the administrations. The Government has said that the result from Brexit “will be a 
significant increase in the decision-making power of each devolved administration.”55 
Nevertheless, the Government prepared a repeal of the European Union legislation 
in order to maintain its effectiveness for now in the United Kingdom called informally 
the Great Repeal Bill (which will be addressed later). This Bill should, according to what 
the Government said, give the devolved administrations more competences, but after the 
Great Repeal Bill was published, both Scotland and Wales rejected it as it just involved 
more powers to the Central Government; and said that it would not pass the consent of 
their respective parliaments –as required by the Sewel Convention.56 
The European Union institutions give the different regions of the Member States 
a lot of presence within the Union, legal recognition and some level of influence. Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales have developed their own relationships with the Union, 
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promoting their interests and priorities; all of which, will cease to exist with Brexit. 
Particularly affected by this is Wales, as it has been a net beneficiary of the European 
Union funds for the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds –as these funds 




The way in which intergovernmental relations are carried out in the United 
Kingdom is through a multilateral forum, the Joint Ministerial Committee. This 
committee is formed by Government ministers from Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales and their equivalent United Kingdom Government Minister. In these reunions the 
ministers from the devolved administrations seek to influence the Central Government to 
promote their interests. This committee operates via the Memorandum of Understanding 
and Supplementary Agreements (mentioned previously in regards of the Sewel 
Convention) which lay out the procedures and principles for the relations between the 
administrations. However, these instruments lack any power to make formally binding 
decisions without being incorporated into a statute, what leaves the effectiveness of the 
Joint Ministerial Committee very much open to question. Besides, there is no obligation 
for the Central Government to hold these meetings and therefore, a lot of time can go by 
from a meeting to the next one.  
What this means is that the intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom 
are really weak in nature, involving just operations of communication and consultation, 
cooperation, the exchange of information and confidentiality.  
The European Union Joint Ministerial Committee was the most effective of the 
Joint Ministerial Committees59 as it was the one that met more regularly in advance of 
European Council meetings. Moreover, this structure allowed the devolved 
administrations ministers to represent the United Kingdom at the European Union 
Council; which before was impossible as it was seen as international relations and was 
hence reserved to the Central Government.  
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With Brexit this Committee will cease to exist; leaving just the existing 
committees for the United Kingdom, which as opposed to the European one, do not allow 
ministers from the devolved administrations to participate in the negotiations. The Welsh 
government tried to call for a seat in the table of negotiations when devolved issues are 
being discussed, but the United Kingdom did not allow it. 60 
The European Union gives the regions of the Member States the possibility to 
defend their own interests in its institutions, empowering the region and developing is 
international presence. This also benefits, as it is the case in the United Kingdom, the 
regions that do not have a lot of power within their own country as they can pursue their 
projects within the Union. 
As it has been laid out, the position and influence of the devolved administrations 
will suffer quite a loss of power with the withdrawal from the European Union. The funds 
they had available from the European Union without the intervention of the Central 
Government will no longer be available, with the consequent loose of capability to take 
their own decisions as to the budget –now they will have to resort to the United Kingdom 
government in order to develop their projects and promote their interests. 
 
ii. Constitutional Law 
As it has been analysed before in the text, the Miller case has dealt with a lot of 
relevant constitutional issues. The prerogative powers were constrained, and the 
sovereignty of Parliament imposed, giving place to the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act 2017 by which the government, with the consent of the Parliament, shall 
give the notification specified in Article 50 to start the withdrawal process. 
First, the conclusion regarding the prerogative as not valid to trigger Article 50, 
ended in a view that "major" constitutional changes can be made only by legislation. 
However, that notion is not supported in authority, and gives the law a highly uncertain 
criterion according to which prerogative power is somewhat delimited and rests upon 
normative constitutional foundations that are unspecified and even arguably inexistent. 
Second, the judgement held that the prerogative powers could not be used to give 
notification because the European Union treaties and European Union legislation are an 
independent source of domestic law. This argument is again vague and does not avoid 
scrutiny as it is true in a sense, but too novel to be as final as it was in an argumentation 
of a judgement. Third, it was argued that the constitutional conventions required an act to 
be enacted in order to trigger the withdrawal from the European Union only if the 
devolved legislatures consented. Nevertheless, the Court refused to give a judgement on 
that matter (with the argument that conventions do not possess legal force) and therefore, 
it can be said that it was too careless to invoke questionable arguments regarding 
constitutional principles in order to sustain its analysis of the prerogative issue, but too 
slow to do the same with the constitutional principles involved in the devolution issue.61 
                                                          
60 J Hunt and R Minto, ‘Between intergovernmental relations and paradiplomacy: Wales and the Brexit of 
the regions’ (2017) 19 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 647, 650. 
61 M Elliot, ‘The Supreme Court’s judgement in Miller: in search of constitutional principle’ (2017) 76 
Cambridge Law Journal 257, 2. 
24 
 
In that line, the constitutional principles brought to the judgement by the Justices 
will give them more weight in future judicial decisions; possibly bringing the law a more 
progressive view of such concepts, which are rather ignored by the judges who generally 
prefer more formal and technical argumentations. Nevertheless, this view was quite 
controversial, and generated a lot of division –which is clear by the dissenting judges– so 
the future consequences of this case are not that definitive.62 
The approach taken by the judges, although mainly progressive, loses that interest 
the judges showed in the arguments referring to prerogative powers, Parliament, etc. when 
it came to the devolved administrations issues. The intention of the judges was to wash 
their hands off but, by doing so, they basically took part deciding that even if the Sewel 
Convention is contained within the devolved legislation in statutes, it is still just of 
political value, and not real legal value. Refusing to judge in that matter, in the same lines 
they did with the other matters, goes against their own argumentation, making it look 
interested and even arbitrary. If they had followed the same line of argumentation, they 
could have made this case even more relevant, as it can be more easily argued that 
conventions do hold a constitutional value and should therefore be considered by Courts, 
than the “constitutional” value they observed in the European Communities Act 1972. 
Therefore, the consequences of this case could be great, but only if this current of 
argument is maintained, bringing a new constitutional analysis in which substance 
prevails over formality. 
 
iii. Special mention to the referendum procedure in the Anglo-Welsh Law 
With the referendum of withdrawal as trigger for the Miller case, some notions of 
the referendum process in the Anglo-Welsh law are convenient. 
There are antecedents of referendums held back in the Middle Ages and earlier, 
nevertheless, the United Kingdom does not have a tradition in holding referendums as 
other democracies do. Instead, it is common to say that an important Bill is finally 
determined by an appeal to the electors, i.e. the appointment of general elections, in which 
key policies are debated. In this way, it can be taken as example the general election of 
1831; as it was evidently close to a referendum. In that election, the country voted in a 
general election to candidates just on the basis of the Reform Bill 1831 (Bill that came 
into effect as the Representation of the People Act 1832, to reform the electoral system).63 
Nowadays, referendums are carried out in the framework of the Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act 2000, in this Act, it was established the Electoral 
Commission that would act as the regulator of referendums.64 However, they are still 
extremely rare, in fact, only three have been held nationally: in 1975 (under the 
Referendum Act 1975 enacted to give answer to the claim of the people of Northern 
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Ireland, Wales and Scotland to held a referendum), 2011 and 2016. Part of this reluctancy 
to hold referendums is due to the already discussed principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty, by which referendums cannot be constitutionally binding on either the 
government or Parliament and therefore the government could ignore the results. The 
non-binding nature of the referendums in the United Kingdom is part of the reason why 
the result of the referendum of 2016 was that controversial; some parts of the public 
demanded the government to ignore the result because of the possible inherence of 
external agents in the poll and the small voting difference between the two possible 
answers (51.9% and 48.1%).65 
As it is a mere political instrument without any legal force, the process to call a 
referendum is rather simple. In order for a referendum to be held, an act has to be passed 
by Parliament in which the question and the possible answers to it must be specified. 
After that, the Electoral Commission is the government body in charge of the whole 
process,66 and who will make sure that everything goes according to the regulation of the 
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VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
Before the Lisbon Treaty, there was no mention in the European legislation that 
allowed a member state to withdraw from the Union. There were two main currents of 
interpretation to this situation. In the first place there was the interpretation that any 
member state could break its relationship with the European Union due to the right of 
sovereign states to withdraw from international treaties. However, some held the opposite 
view, sustaining that the inexistence of such possibility in the European legislation or the 
treaties was an evidence of the firmness and the irreversibility of the accession to the 
Union. Therefore, until the Lisbon Treaty was signed, the only possible way out was the 
negotiation with the European Union representatives. 
The only two examples we have of a territory leaving the European Union –or 
what then was the European Union– is the case of Greenland and Algeria. Nevertheless, 
these cases are not really helpful as to the situation of United Kingdom, since they were 
a part of the European Communities because of they were part of Denmark and France, 
respectively. In those cases, they ceased to be part of the European Communities when 
they obtained their independence from the said countries (although Greenland did not 
leave as a State per se due to its special international condition).68 
Since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty it is possible to withdraw from the 
European Union through a regulated method; such method is contained in its Article 50. 
According to it: 
“ 1. Any Member State may, in accordance with its constitutional rules, to withdraw 
from the Union.  
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council 
of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union 
shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements 
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the 
Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union 
by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.  
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification 
referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member 
State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.  
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council 
or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. 
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A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.  
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall 
be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.”69 
There has never been a withdrawal of a country from the European Union –as it 
is nowadays– and therefore, the route to follow is rather uncertain. The only reference to 
the possible withdrawal of a country is in the Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
(above), in force since 2009, which states in its Article 50(2) that a Member State may 
withdraw from the Union in the way its constitutional requirements allow it.70 The 
constitutional requirements of the United Kingdom have been addressed above and now 
the withdrawal process should be as contained in the mentioned Article, and once 
triggered, the process is irrevocable.71 
The notification, following the judgement of the Supreme Court, was made in the 
Brexit case through the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 starting 
the withdrawal process the 29th of March 2017. Article 50(3) of the treaty gives 2 years 
once the notification has been given, to negotiate an agreement, if there is not an 
agreement before those 2 years pass, every “[t]reaties shall cease to apply to the State” 
unless there is an unanimous agreement between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom to extend that period72 –which is highly doubtful since the European Union 
wants the withdrawal to happen as soon as possible, as it is an anomalous situation 
spreading uncertainty over the European politics and the internal market. 
The process to follow is quite complex since it requires the voting of the 
agreement in different stages, from the consent of the European Parliament to the 
approval by a qualified majority of the Council of the European Union. Once triggered, 
the United Kingdom will continue to take part in most of the decisions but will be 
excluded from internal discussions or the decisions about its own withdrawal.   
The position the United Kingdom may take with respect to the European Union 
may be in the same condition as Norway, which is a member of the European Economic 
Area which grants the country access to the single market without being a member of the 
Union. In that position, the member is affected by most of the decisions taken in the 
European Union but does not have a vote in them. However, this possible solution is not 
very popular as it is still seen as a loss of sovereignty; in the United Kingdom, the desired 
end to the negotiations seem to be the negotiation of new treaties that allow the United 
Kingdom to remain fully independent from the European Union but able to access its 
single market. According to the latest information, this is highly improbable as the Union 
would not allow it without some conditions on the British side.73 
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Whatever the position both parties support in the negotiation, what is clear is that 
the negotiations have a due date imposed by Article 50 of two years after the notification 
of the withdrawal, that will not allow this situation to be extended much longer. 
Without the enforcement of European Union law, the United Kingdom will be 
lacking almost 50 years of legislation on the matters that were regulated on a European 
level; to avoid this, the Parliament of the United Kingdom is preparing legislation in order 
to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 but continue to enforce all the European 
legislation that was enforceable in the United Kingdom, this piece of legislation is the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill,74 known informally as “the Great Repeal Bill”.75 This 
way, they will continue under the effect of the European legislation and the "gap" of 
British legislation will be covered by the European Union one. 
 With that move, they may be anticipating what the government will have to do to 
continue its trade with the Union; i.e. not being part of it but having to apply its legislation 
either way, in order to be able to comply with the standards of the European Union 
market, which are among the highest in the world. 
 When triggering Article 50, the Prime Minister, Teresa May, said “we are leaving 
the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe – and we want to remain committed 
partners and allies to our friends across the continent.”76 However, that kind of 
relationship with the European Union is complex. Even outside the Union, the legislation 
of it will affect every possible co-operation agreement the United Kingdom may reach 
with a Member State because such agreements must be based in European Union law and 
with attention not to infringe the external competence of the Union. In short, if a Non-
Member State wants to co-operate with a Member State, such co-operation is subject to 
the requirements of European Union law, irrespective of whether it takes place within or 
outside of its framework.77 
 The European Union holds exclusive competences in the areas contained in 
Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
“Article 3: 1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
(a) customs union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the Member States 
whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological resources 
under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy.  
2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of 
                                                          
74 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill HL Bill (2017-2019) 79. 
75 J Rothwell and L Hughes, ‘What is the EU Withdrawal Bill? The only explanation you need to read’ 
The Telegraph (12 June 2018) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/0/eu-withdrawal-bill-explanation-
need-read/>  accessed 15 June 2018. 
76 T May, ‘Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50’ (2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-
50> Accessed 15 June 2018. 
77 P Leino and L Leppavirta, ‘Does staying together mean playing together? The influence of EU law on 





the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, 
or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
What this means is that the Member States cannot act in any of those areas of exclusive 
performance by the Union unless it empowers them to do so.78 
All the above mentioned goes against the desire of the United Kingdom to remain 
trading with the European Union or any of its members, leaving a difficult scenario for 
the United Kingdom, who will have to accept the Union conditions in order to keep its 
current access to the internal market and keep applying European Union legislation on at 






















                                                          
78 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and 
third countries [2012] OJ 2012 L351/40, para 1. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION  
This case has been by far the most important constitutional case in years. Giving 
that it is a constitutional case triggered by a matter of international law, it is easy to see 
how the law is –or was– evolving towards a more open approach, with much more 
presence of international law in the domestic law; even as the Court said in its judgement 
as an independent source of domestic law79 and acquiring some flavour of constitutional 
law. It is interesting to see how the world is evolving to a greater interrelation of different 
sovereignties and the legislation of different entities, to a point that one cannot really 
survive or make sense without the other, unless isolated from the rest of the world. The 
Law is about setting the rules for the relationships between people, and as such, the 
increasing relationships between countries forces them to a broader interaction of their 
legislation and therefore, the confusion of them will be at some point in time, inevitable. 
This evolvement is due greatly to the new technologies, which spread without 
barriers, and the increment in the movement of people, whom start to have a more diffuse 
concept of the old borders and are shocked by the amount of time, documents and 
bureaucracy needed to go to a third country –at least in Europe. 
While the Miller case has given a quite progressive judgement, the judicial system 
in United Kingdom is still really dependent on formality, on the literacy of the wording, 
more than the meaning of it, the substance. Courts prefer a written section in a Statute 
than a not well stablished principle of the law; and given that their legal system is based 
in case law (which makes principles more uncertain), the Courts are reluctant to make use 
of them. At the end, this case was the triumph of the sovereignty of Parliament over the 
Government, which is a principle recognisable by anyone in the United Kingdom, even 
if complexly argued; and thus, a clear advancement for society. 
Although the judgement can be criticised in many ways, the final result is clearly 
the result it should have been; that is why the Secretary of State did not have many 
arguments in its favour apart from the inexistence of certain words in a statute. The 
approach of the United Kingdom to the law is quite mechanical in certain matters, 
ignoring the interpretative role of the courts. Judges should not find it so difficult to give 
a judgement based on constitutional principles because they are what hold the law 
together. 
  As for the prerogative powers of the Crown, given the abuse the Government tried 
to make of them, they should be under more control by Parliament due to the unusual 
powers they are and their origin (it should not be forgotten that they are not democratic 
powers but heirs of the monarchs’ power). If such powers are still in place, is because 
they have proven to be useful as a quick method to rule on some matters but it is important 
that the Government’s actions are subject to scrutiny in order to not lose the balance 
between the different powers. 
The fact that the devolved administrations were mostly ignored in the case 
(although probably reasonable) does not help the difficult situation the United Kingdom 
faces. The issues with the devolved administrations could rise if they do not see the Sewel 
Convention respected by the Government and any other agreements reached as part of 
                                                          
79 Miller (n 7), [80]. 
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the intergovernmental relations instruments. The representation of the countries that 
compose the United Kingdom is minimal as to governmental decisions, which are 
handled entirely by the Central Government, who can even come to an agreement with 
one of them and do the exact opposite of that agreed to. 
Finally, Brexit could mean taking back the sovereignty that had been handed over 
to the European Union, or it could just result in an appearance of that; making Parliament 
copy and paste every policy that the European Union applies. If that were the case, it 
would in fact go in detriment of the United Kingdom’s sovereignty because the United 
Kingdom would be applying –by his own Parliament– policies from foreign governments 
in which it did not take part or vote; resulting in the loss of representation of the United 
Kingdom and, therefore, its sovereignty. How is a country that is forced to comply with 
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